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ARGUMENT
I.

APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR RELIEF WAS REQUIRED UNDER THE
CIRCUMSTANCES.
Appellee, Clausing's, main argument is that the statutes do not authorize the

Appellant's initial motion ("motion for relief) filed with the ALJ after Clausing's
interpretation of the September 23,2005 Order became known on December 1,2005. (Brief
of Appellee, Point I). Clausing's main argument is not supported by the evidence in this
case, and should therefore be rejected. Under the circumstances and facts of this case, the
filing of Appellant's motion for relief from Clausing's interpretation of the September 2005
Order was not only authorized, but in a practical sense, required.
The circumstances which mandated the motion for relief include the following facts:
1) Clausing ignored the undisputed facts of the case and intentionally interpreted the Order
in a way that would make the Order illegal (Appellant's Brief, Sections I-II); 2) Clausing did
not disclose her interpretation until December 1, 2005 (Rec. 394)[; 3) until March 17,2006,
there was no reason for the Appellant to file a Motion for Review; and 4) Clausing attempted
to collect $183,561.85 to which she was admittedly not entitled. (Rec. 157). A proper
response, under these circumstances, was to approach the ALJ for an order invalidating
Clausing's interpretation.

The motion was filed on December 21, 2005, the day after

Clausing attempted to collect the $183,561.75. (Rec. 163).
Clausing argues that a Motion for Review filed with the Appeals Board of the Labor
Commission ("Labor Commission") should have been filed within 30 days of the September

Clausing's implies that the attempted but failed pre-December 1, 2005 phone calls provided
notice of the dispute earlier are both unfounded and iiTelevant. Clausing has produced no evidence
that she disclosed her demands for either $123,061.20 or $183,561.85 prior to December 1, 2005.
Moreover, the earliest phone call alleged by Clausing occurred on November 4, 2005, already more
than 30 days after the September 2005 Order was issued. (Rec. 394).
-1-

2005 Order. First, there was no need to file a Motion for Review inasmuch as the September
2005 Order, interpreted correctly, did not award the amounts Clausing attempted to collect.
The issue did not even arise until December 1, 2005, 68 days after the Order was issued.
Second, even after the issue arose on December 1, 2005, there was no basis for a Motion for
Review until the meaning of the September 2005 Order became known on March 17, 2006,
when the ALJ issued his order on the motion for relief.
A.

The September 2005 Order Was Correct When Issued.

Clausing falsely supposes that the Appellant was required to appeal the Order within
30 days of September 23, 2005. Clausing, however, ignores the facts and circumstances of
the case in reaching this supposition. Foremost among the ignored facts and circumstances
is that there was no confusion, uncertainty, misunderstanding, or even error in the September
23, 2005 Order. The September 23, 2005 Order was proper when it was issued. Any good
faith interpretation of the September 23,2005 Order, necessarily recognizing the undisputed
and acknowledged facts of the case, would not have raised any reasonable confusion as to
the Order's meaning.
The dispute became known only after Clausing asserted that the September 23, 2005
Order required payment of $123, 061.20 in Temporary Total Disability ("TTD") benefits,
which Clausing admits she was not entitled to. Clausing's present argument that Appellant
should have been confused by the September 23, 2005 Order as soon as it was issued, would
have required that the Appellant ignore, as explained in the Appellant's Brief, the Order as
a whole, the undisputed facts showing no entitlement to TTD benefits, and the
acknowledgment by Clausing that she was not entitled to TTD benefits. The Labor
Commission erred in requiring a Motion for Review within 30 days of the September 2005
Order under such circumstances.

i.

Clausing's interpretation was meritless in light of the undisputed
facts of the case.

The known and undisputed facts at the time of the September 23,2005 Order include:
1) Clausing's settlement of all claims from March 1999 to January 14, 2002 (Appellant's
Brief, Statement of Facts #2); 2) the judicial confirmation of Clausing's settlement of all
claims as of October 22, 2002 (Appellant's Brief, Statement of Facts #2); 3) Clausing's
request for TTD benefits for "only misc. dates after surgeries or for treatment prior to MMI"
(Appellant's Brief, Statement of Facts #5); 4) Appellant's acknowledged payment of all TTD
benefits for "misc. dates after surgeries" from March 18, 1999 to January 14, 2002, plus
additional amounts, totaling a minimum of $5,162.66 (Appellant's Brief, page 18 (citing Rec.
404-405)) or $6,136.66 (Brief of Appellee, Addendum #5; Rec. 216); 5) all TTD benefits
ever owed from March 18, 1999, even including post-settlement dates, totaled a mere
$4,451.18 (9.14 weeks x $487.00) (Appellant's Brief, page 21, Statement of Facts #6, Exhibit
H); and 6) TTD benefits were never an issue presented to the medical panel (Appellant's
Brief, Statement of Facts #7).
In order for the September 23, 2005 Order to have been reasonably disputed as of
September 23, 2005, the preceding facts would have to have been ignored, eliminated,
disavowed, or forgotten. They were not, nor should they have been.
ii.

Appellant's interpretation was the only reasonable interpretation.

If Clausing had interpreted the September 23, 2005 Order as a whole, and in good
faith recognized the undisputed facts as of that date, there would never have been any
dispute. Clausing, however, unreasonably interpreted the Order in a way that would allow
her to obtain $183,561.85 (Rec. 157) to which she was not entitled. She therefore created
a dispute where none reasonably existed.
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Importantly, Clausing repeatedly admits that the September 23, 2005 Order, as
interpreted by her, is "improper" and "embodie[s] a significant judicial error." (Brief of
Appellee, pg. 7, 10, 36). That very fact, admitted as it is, shows that Appellant's
interpretation was not only a reasonable interpretation, but the only reasonable interpretation.
Any other interpretation would have made the Order contradict the factual evidence of the
case. Appellant cannot be expected to appeal an order that, if interpreted correctly, is correct.
The Labor Commission erred in holding otherwise.
iii.

An incorrect interpretation does not make a proper order
improper.

Clausing has admitted that her interpretation of the September 2005 Order made the
Order improper. (Brief of Appellee, pg. 7, 10, 36). With such knowledge, Clausing knew
or should have known that it was her interpretation that was incorrect, and not that the Order
was incorrect. Clausing's argument is backwards. An incorrect interpretation should not be
used to invalidate an order.

Rather, the order, in light of the recognized facts and

circumstances, should invalidate the incorrect interpretation.
B.

The Motion for Review Was Taken From the March 17, 2006 Order.

In arguing that the Motion for Review was properly rejected because it was not filed
within 30 days of the September 2005 Order, Clausing ignores the fact that the Motion for
Review was taken from the March 17} 2006 Order.
As explained above, no dispute regarding the meaning of the September 2005 Order
arose until Clausing's December 1, 2005 demand. A motion for relief from Clausing's
interpretation of that Order was then filed with the ALJ. As a practical matter, such a motion
was required. If not filed, the meaning of the September 2005 Order would have remained
in dispute, and the litigation would have remained perpetually unresolved. Such motions are
-4_

necessaiy in these situations, as is evident by the existence of Rule 52 and 59 of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure. Such motions, it follows, are likewise permissible in the more
flexible and informal Labor Commission proceedings. See Pilcher v. State Department of
Social Services, 663 P.2d 450 (Utah 1983)
The ALJ issued his order on the Appellant's motion for relief on March 17, 2006,
which for the first time accepted Clausing's interpretation, despite its complete contradiction
to the factual evidence. (Rec. 407-409). The March 17, 2006 Order was therefore the first
order to make the dispute appealable under a Motion for Review. Prior to March 17, 2006,
the meaning of the September 2005 Order could not be appealed for the simple reason that,
from December 1, 2005 to March 17, 2006, the meaning of the September 2005 Order was
unknown and disputed.
Once the ALJ issued his March 17, 2006 Order, the meaning of the September 2005
Order was no longer uncertain, the errors of the ALJ were clear, and the appropriate Motion
for Review was filed based upon the March 17, 2006 Order. The Motion itself states that it
seeks to review the order "entered on March 17, 2006." (Rec. 338-339). The memorandum
in support of the Motion for Review argued that, if interpreted correctly and as a whole, the
September 2005 Order was proper when it was issued. It also argued that no dispute
regarding the meaning of the September 2005 Order arose until December 1, 2005. (Rec.
340-357, 352). The Labor Commission did not even address these issues, which was error,
and merely held that the Motion for Review was not timely. (Rec. 460-463). The Labor
Commission's holding, however, was incorrectly based on the September 2005 Order, and
not the March 17, 2006 Order. (Rec. 460-463).

-5-

i.

The Motion for Review was timely filed, even if taken from the
September 2005 Order.

Further, even had the Motion for Review were considered to have been taken from
the September 2005 Order, Clausing's argument again fails because under the facts present
in this case, the 30 day period did not begin to run until March 17, 2006. As argued above,
the meaning of the September 2005 Order first became disputed on December 1, 2005, but
not until March 17, 2006 was the dispute resolved and the meaning of the September 2005
Order known.
The timeliness of an appeal is determined after consideration of a number of factors,
including the existence of further contemplated action, amendments or modifications of prior
orders, the finality of the order, and tolling issues. See State v. Leatherbury, 65 P.3d 1180
(Utah 2003); Nielson v. Gurley. 888 P.2d 130 (Utah App. 1994). It is clear that the
timeliness of an appeal is not based exclusively on an order date. In Gurley, the court
specifically re-iterated the longstanding law that a subsequent order modifying or amending
a judgment in a material way tolls the appeal time. Gurley, at 132. The March 17, 2006
Order modified or amended the September 2005 Order in a material way by granting
$183,561.20 to Clausing, which the September 2005 Order, reasonably interpreted in light
of the undisputed and acknowledged facts of the case, did not do. Prior to March 17, 2006,
the meaning of the September 2005 Order was unlaiown. The March 17, 2006 materially
changed the situation.
Once the March 17, 2006 Order was issued, the Motion for Review was filed. The
Motion for Review properly presented facts and circumstances before the Labor Commission
to show that the Motion for Review was timely. The Labor Commission, however, not only
failed, but actually refused to consider the facts and circumstances relevant to timeliness.
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Instead, it limited its review specifically to whether a Rule 60(b) motion may be filed in
administrative proceedings. (Rec. 461). This was error. The Labor Commission had the
obligation to determine whether the Motion for Review was timely, and in doing so, it was
obligated to consider all factors relevant to timeliness, and not merely an order date.
It is fundamental that a party is entitled to appeal rights. (Utah Constitution Article
VIII, §5). As stated above, the Labor Commission failed to address any of the factors
necessary to determining timeliness. The Labor Commission ignored and denied the
Appellant's appeal rights. The Motion for Review did not rise or fall on whether a "Rule
60(b)" motion may be filed in administrative proceedings. (Rec. 461). Rather, it rose or fell
based on the arguments contained in the Motion for Review - its content. "[T]he right to an
appeal is a valuable and constitutional right and ought not to be denied except where it is
clear the right has been lost or abandoned." Gurley, at 132. The Labor Commission erred in
not addressing the content of the Motion for Review, including the content as to timeliness.
By not addressing the content of the Motion for Review, including the factors relevant to
timeliness, the Labor Commission erred.
For example, if an appellee claims that appeal time began miming from an order dated
January 1, but an appellant asserts that the appeal time did not begin running until a
subsequent order on March 1, the court must consider not only the dates of the orders, but
all of the other relevant facts to determine when the appeal time began to run. The Labor
Commission did not consider anything other than the September 2005 date. It did not
address the fact that no dispute arose until December 1,2005. It did not address whether the
Appellant's pre-December 1, 2005 interpretation was reasonable. It did not even address
whether Clausing's pre-December 2005 inteipretation was reasonable. It did not address the
fact that the meaning of the September 2005 Order did not become known until March 17,
-7-

2006. Rather, the Labor Commission held, as a matter of law exclusive of all other facts, that
the appeal time began running in September 2005. This was error.
Presently, on appeal, the timeliness of the Motion for Review must be reviewed under
a correctness standard. See Kennecott Corp., v. State Tax Comm'n, 814 P.2d 1099 (Utah
1991).
C.

The Principles of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Are Applicable in
Administrative Proceedings.

Clausing argues, and the Labor Commission incorrectly held, that Appellant's motion
for relief from Clausing's interpretation of the September 2005 Order was not permitted
under Utah law. Clausing has produced no law or rule to support the assertion. Under Utah
law, including administrative law, such motions are permitted.
Clausing purports to support her argument by noting that the Utah Administrative
Procedures Act ("UAPA") does not specifically "require" the use of the rules or principles
in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure or "subject" administrative proceedings to the URCP.
(Brief of Appellee, pg 24). Such statements are irrelevant. Whether the UAPA specifically
"requires" compliance with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is irrelevant to whether the
rules or principles set forth in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure are applicable to
administrative proceedings. In fact, Utah administrative case law clearly shows that the
principles and rules set forth in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure should be liberally applied
in administrative proceedings. The Labor Commission erred in holding otherwise.2

2

Contrary to Clausing's assertion, Appellant never asserted that URCP Rule 60(b) must be
incorporated into the UAPA. (Brief of Appellee, Point IB, pg. 26, 41-42). Clausing's accompanying
argument and citation to Mini Spas Inc., v. Ind. Comm'n, 733 P.2d 130 (Utah 1987) and Airkem
Intermountain v. Parker, 513 P.2d 429 (Utah 1973) are consequently irrelevant.
-R-

The applicability of the principles and rules of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure in
administrative proceedings is evidenced not only by the cases cited in the Appellant's Brief,
but also by the very case cited by Clausing's Appellee's Brief. Clausing selectively quotes
from Pilcher v. State Department of Social Services, 663 P.2d 450 (Utah 1983). Fully
quoted, however, the Pilcher case explains that it is the restrictions of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure that do not apply in administrative proceedings.
While the mode of procedure before administrative bodies may conform to the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the rules governing civil procedure in the trial
courts are not necessarily applicable to administrative proceedings. [Citations
omitted]. Thus, administrative proceedings are not subject to the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure unless the governing statute or regulations so provide.
Administrative proceedings are usually conducted with greater flexibility and
informality than judicial proceedings. [Citation Omitted]. Rigid adherence to
judicial procedures in administrative proceedings is generally inappropriate
because it ignores basic differences between judicial and administrative
procedures. [Citation Omitted].
(Emphasis added). The reason the Rules of Civil Procedure are not specifically required by
the UAPA is to allow administrative proceedings "greater flexibility and informality." It is
not to restrict the use of the principles set forth in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. This
is made clear in another case cited by Clausing, State Tax Comm'n v. Iverson, 782 P.2d 519,
527-528 (Utah 1989). In that case, Iverson argued that because the subpoena issued to him
m an administrative proceeding did not strictly comply with the provisions of Rule 45(d)(2)
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the subpoena was invalid. Recognizing that the reason
compliance with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is not mandated in administrative
proceedings is to allow "greater flexibility and informality," the court simply held that
Iverson had not been prejudiced, and rejected Iverson's technical argument. Id.
The case law cited by Clausing shows nothing more than that the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure are not to be used as a tool to restrict the presentation of arguments and flexibility
-9-

in administrative proceedings. Clausing provides no case law precluding the use of the rules
and principles of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, especially when such use is consistent
with the administrative puiposes of "greater flexibility and informality."3

In fact, the

opposite is true. Utah case law shows that courts have consistently applied such rules and
principles when it does not restrict administrative flexibility. See Paulsen v. The Industrial
Commission, 770 P.2d 125 (Utah 1989); Bowen Trucking v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 559 P.2d
954, 956 (Utah 1977).
In direct contradiction to Clausing's argument, Utah courts state that "[i]nherent in
the power to make an administrative decision is the authority to reconsider a decision.
[Citations omitted]. . . The absence of specific authority in the governing statutes is not
determinative. Every tribunal has some power to correct its own mistakes."Career Serv.
Review Bd. v. Utah Dep't of Corrections, 942 P.2d 933, 946 (Utah 1997)(emphasis added).
The Labor Commission erred in holding otherwise.
II.

CLAUSING'S ARGUMENT IS DEFEATED BY HER CONCESSIONS.
As part of her main argument, Clausing concedes that under the "continuing

jurisdiction" provisions of the Workers Compensation Act, the agency has the authority to
modify its previous orders on the basis of 1) "subsequently discovered facts," 2) "evidence
of some significant change or new development," or 3) "proof of the previous award's
inadequacy." (Appelee's Brief, pg. 29, fn. 66). Based upon the facts present in this case,
Clausing thereby concedes that the Labor Commission did indeed have the authority to

3

The UAPA states only that the administrative rules "are not required to conform to
common law orstatutoiy rules of evidence or other technical rules of procedure" and that the
commission is "not bound . . . by any technical or formal rules of procedure." UCA 34A-1304(l)(b); 34A-2-801(l) (Emphasis added). Such language does not preclude the Appellant's
motion for relief, as a matter of law, as held by the Labor Commission.
-10-

correct the ALJ's September 2005 or March 2006 Orders, and consequently, that it erred in
determining otherwise.
A.

The Discovery of a Dispute Regarding the Meaning of the September 2005
Order Constitutes a "Subsequently Discovered Fact."

The Motion for Review showed that Appellant did not become aware of any dispute
regarding the meaning of the September 2005 Order until December 1,2005. The existence
of a dispute regarding the meaning of the September 2005 Order became known on
December 1, 2005, and therefore the arising of the dispute qualifies as a "subsequently
discovered fact," going to the very merits of the litigation. By conceding that the Labor
Commission has the authority to modify previous orders in such circumstances, Clausing
necessarily concedes that the Labor Commission had the authority to modify the previous
September 2005 Order. The Labor Commission erred in holding that it had no authority to
modify the September 2005 Order based upon its continuing jurisdiction.
B.

The Discovery of a Dispute and the Entry of the March 17, 2006 Order
Both Consitute a "Significant Change or Development."

It was likewise clear to the Labor Commission that the meaning of the September
2005 Order was not made clear until March 17, 2006. The December 1, 2005 discovery of
a dispute, and the March 17,2006 resolution of the December 1,2005 dispute both constitute
"evidence of some significant change or new development." These developments changed
the entire litigation. Clausing concedes, therefore, that the Labor Commission had the
authority to modify the previous September 2005 and March 17, 2006 Orders. The Labor
Commission erred by refusing to recognize its continuing jurisdiction and ability to correct
the ALJ's mistakes.
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C.

There Is Not Only Abundant "Proof," but Also Admissions of the
"Previous Award's Inadequacy."

Most importantly, even if no "subsequently discovered facts" had been found, and
even if no "significant change" had taken place, the fact remains undisputed thaf'proof of the
previous award's inadequacy" was provided to the Labor Commission.

The Labor

Commission recognized the ALJ's errors, but incorrectly held that it could do nothing to
correct the errors.4 (Rec. 462). Clausing's Appellee's Brief likewise admits that the Labor
Commission recognized the error. (Brief of Appellee, pg. 39). Clausing, therefore,
consequently admits that the Labor Commission indeed had the authority to correct the
"previous award's inadequacy." (Appelee's Brief, pg. 29, fn. 66). Clausing's Appellee's
Brief openly concedes that the Labor Commission erred in detemiining it had no authority
to do so.
D.

The Admitted Existence of a "Significant Judicial Error" Authorized the
Labor Commission to Reverse the ALJ. The Labor Commission Erred in
Holding Otherwise.

The authority to correct mistakes under the continuing jurisdiction statute is further
confirmed by the Paulsen v. Indus. Comm'n, 770 P.2d 125 (Utah 1989) previously cited in
Appellant's Brief and quoted at length by Clausing in her Brief. Under Paulsen, the
continuing jurisdiction statute "gives the Commission broad authority to make substantive
changes in its orders when substantial changes in the circumstances have occurred." id,, at
130. The erred in failing to do so.

4

The Labor Commission acknowledged the ALJ's errors stating that the "Appeals Board is
aware that [the ALJ's] decision may have awarded excessive temporary total disability
compensation to Ms. Clausing," but it still refused to correct them. (Rec. 462)
-1?-

The Paulsen court specifically expanded the right to correct errors beyond mere
"clerical errors" to include "substantive changes." The Paulsen court specifically includes
"judicial errors" as a "substantive change." Id. Clausing admits, throughout her Brief that
the September 2005 Order as "embod[ying] a significant judicial error." (Brief of Appellee,
pg. 7, 10, 36). By conceding the principles in Paulsen and at the same time asserting the
existence of a "significant judicial error" in the September 2005 Order, Clausing defeats her
own argument and position. The very facts and case law cited by Clausing show the Labor
Commission's error in determining it had no authority to correct the error, as well as its error
in not doing so.
III.

THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AS PRESENTED BY APPELLANT ARE
PROPERLY BEFORE THE COURT AND SHOULD NOT BE LIMITED.
In her Brief, Clausing argues for the first time that the only issue before the Appeals

Court is the "propriety of the denial of that [Rule 60(b)] motion." (Brief of Appellee, pg. 33).
Clausing's arguments ignore the fact that the Motion for Review was timely filed after the
March 17, 2006 Order and preserved all of the issues for appeal, including the merits of the
case. Clausing also ignores the content of the motion for relief and the basis for appeal in
an effort to limit the issues on appeal.
A.

The Motion for Review Properly Preserved the Issues on Appeal.

Clausing's argument fails to recognize that the meaning of the September 2005 Order
did not become known until March 17, 2006. Clausing fails to recognize that the Appellant
thereafter timely filed a Motion for Review challenging the merits of the case decided by that
March 17, 2006 Order. The fact that the Labor Commission did not consider the merits of
the Motion for Review does not limit the issues on appeal. That is, of course, a basis for the
appeal. The Labor Commission erred in not considering the merits of the case when it denied
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the Motion for Review, properly and timely taken from the March 17, 2006 Order. The
merits of the case were properly before the Labor Commission on the Motion for Review,
and are properly before the Appeals Court now.
B.

The Motion for Relief Should Be Considered According to its Content,
Not its Title.

Under Utah law, motion for relief should be judged by its content, and not by its title.
See Howard v. Howard, 356 P.2d 275 (Utah 1960). In Armstrong Rubber v. Bastian, 657
P.2d 1346, 1348 (Utah 1983) the court explained "[i]f the nature of the motion can be
ascertained from the substance of the instrument, we have heretofore held that an improper
caption is not fatal to that motion." The motion for relief argued that the September 2005
Order, properly interpreted, was clear. It argued that all claims had been settled as of
October 2002. (Rec. 170). It argued further that it learned of Clausing5s interpretation for
the first time on December 1, 2005. (Rec. 170-171). It is clear that the motion for relief
requested relief from Clausing's interpretation, and for an eventual order to determine if any
TTD benefits were owed. (Rec. 172-173). Such a motion, under the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, would be properly considered under either Rule 60, Rule 52, and/or Rule 59.
Under the more flexible and infomial administrative procedures, such a motion is likewise
permissible, regardless of its title. Considering the circumstances, where the meaning of the
September 2005 Order was in dispute, the motion was absolutely necessary. Without such
a motion, the meaning of the September 2005 Order would have remained perpetually in
dispute. There is nothing in the administrative rules, or the more restrictive Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, that would make such a motion inappropriate.
The motion for relief was not, as characterized by Clausing, a "substitute for a timely
appeal." (Brief of Appellee, pg. 33). As explained above, when the motion for relief was
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filed, no appeal was or should have been expected. There was no appealable issue until
March 17, 2006. Further, the Appellant cannot be expected to appeal the meaning of an
order when the Appellant's interpretation is the only reasonable interpretation, and the only
interpretation that complies with the acknowledged facts of the case.
The motion for relief properly raised the issues that are on appeal today. Those issues
were also properly and timely presented in the later Motion for Review after the March 17,
2006 Order. These issues are now properly before the Appeals Court. This appeal, therefore,
is not limited to the mere propriety of the motion for relief under Rule 60(b).
C.

Even If the Issues on Appeal Were Limited, the Labor Commission
Should Still Be Reversed.

Even if the Labor Commission were merely to consider the propriety of the motion
for relief under Rule 60(b), the Labor Commission's order should still be reversed.
i.

The Labor Commission erred in not addressing, much less finding
excusable neglect.

Clausing argues, incorrectly, that a motion for review must have been filed within 30
days of September 2005. First, because the meaning of the September 2005 Order was not
in dispute until December 1, 2005. Second, because the content of the motion makes the 30
day time limit inapplicable.
As of December 1,2005, the meaning of the September 2005 Order became unknown
and remained in limbo. In these circumstances, the Appellant acted as any "reasonably
prudent person [would act] under the same circumstances" when it filed the motion for relief
with the ALL Interstate Excavating v. Agla Dev. Corp., 611 P.2d 369, 372 (Utah 1980).
Appellant's failure to file a Motion for Review within 30 days of the September 2005 Order
is, under such circumstances, justifiably excused. It is an abuse of discretion to require a
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party to appeal an issue within 30 days of September 2005, when the appealable issue did not
even arise until December 1,2005 and did not become appealable until March 17,2006. The
ALJ and Labor Commission erred in holding as they did.5
Furthermore, even under the more restrictive principles of Rule 60(b)(1), Appellant
would be allowed 3 months to file its "excusable neglect" motion, either in the form of a
motion for relief or motion for review, from either the September 2005 Order or the March
17, 2006 Order. In Lund v. Brown, 11 P.3d 277 (Utah 2000), the court held that a party's
good faith, legitimate reliance on the protection of a bankruptcy stay provision constituted
a justification under Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b) for a failure to reply to the counterclaim. Similarly,
the Appellant's good faith reliance on its reasonable interpretation, in fact the only
reasonable interpretation, provides similar justification for both its motion for relief and
Motion for Review. The ALJ and Labor Commission erred in failing to so find.
ii.

The Labor Commission erred in not finding that the TTD claims
had been satisfied.

The content of Appellant's motion for relief to the ALJ and Motion for Review can
also be justified under the principles of Rule 60(b)(5) in that the TTD judgment rendered has
already been satisfied. As explained in the Appellant's Brief, Clausing judicially settled all
her claims as of October 22, 2002. (Rec. 364-368, 371). Importantly, this fact is never
disputed, or even addressed by Clausing.

5

Contrary to Clausing's argument, the Labor Commission did not "interpret" the
September 2005 Order when it ruled on the Motion for Review. (Brief of Appellee, pg. 36,
39)(emphasis added). The Labor Commission did not even address the merits of the Motion
for Review relating to interpretation. Rather, it held essentially as a matter of law, that the
September 2005 Order could not be reviewed because more than 30 days had passed since
it was signed. This is error.
_i£_

All TTD benefits owed from the date of the accident, March 1999, amounting to 9.14
weeks (64 days), had been paid to Clausing prior to the September 2005 Order. The
September 2005 Order, as interpreted by Clausing, not only awarded these amounts once
again, but it ordered additional TTD payments for 263.57 weeks (1,845 days) during which
Clausing was not temporarily totally disabled. (Appellant's Brief, pg. 20-21).
These facts relating to the October 2002 settlement are contained in both the motion
for relief and the Motion for Review (Rec. 170, 342,364-368). The facts regarding the TTD
were likewise presented. (Rec. 194-195, 383-384). The facts regarding the payment of TTD
amounts owed were also presented. (Rec. 171-172, 342, 351). The facts presented to both
the ALJ and the Labor Commission show that all TTD amounts owed, were previously paid.
Even under the more restrictive Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, specifically Rule 60(b)(5),
the motion for relief and Motion for Review were appropriate. The Labor Commission erred
in not addressing this issue. It also erred in not reversing the ALJ on this basis.
iii.

The Labor Commission erred in not reversing the ALJ for other
reasons justifying relief.

The content of the motion for relief and Motion for Review also provides justification
for reversal under the principles of Rule 60(b)(6). Even under the more restrictive Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure, the filing of such a motion is not limited by any specific deadline, but
rather, may be filed within a "reasonable time." See Laub v. South Central Utah Tel. Ass'n.,
657 P.2d 1304 (Utah 1982). The reasons justifying relief under Rule 60(b)(6) have been set
forth in detail in the Appellant's Brief and this Reply. These arguments were likewise raised
in the motion for relief and the Motion for Review, including the fact that Appellant's
inteipretation of the September 2005 Order was reasonable considering the facts and
circumstances. Consequently, no action was taken until after December 1, 2005 when
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Clausing made the demand for amounts she was not entitled to. The Labor Commission's
decision, and Clausing's present argument, both based upon the failure to file within 30 days
of September 2005 is groundless.
Of course, there are numerous additional facts, foremost among them is Clausing's
admission that she is not entitled to any of the TTD she now demands, which likewise justify
relief
iv.

The Labor Commission erred in not addressing the content of the
Motion for Review.

Contrary to Clausing's present arguments, the content of the motion for relief and the
Motion for Review justify both motions under the principles explained above, as well as the
principles in Rule 52 and Rule 59. The ALJ's Order, as admitted by Clausing, contains a
significant error, if inteipreted as Clausing argues. It awards $183,561.85 for TTD, none of
which Clausing is entitled to.
Once the Appellant learned of the disputed interpretation, a motion for relief became
justified under the principles of Rules 52 and 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. There
is certainly nothing under Utah law or the administrative rules precluding such motions from
being filed. Nor is there any reason why such motions would be allowed under the more
formal Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, but not under the more flexible and informal
administrative procedures.
Further, once the ALJ issued its March 17, 2006 Order, which for the first time
clarified the meaning of the September 2005 Order, the principles encompassed by Rules 52
and 59 again became applicable. Therefore, even had it not been completely proper under
the administrative rules, the Motion for Review would nonetheless be appropriate under the
principles of Rules 52 and 59. However, as explained above, the Labor Commission
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completely ignored the content of the Motion for Review, and utterly failed to address the
content of the Motion for Review. Instead, it determined essentially as a matter of law, that
any and all motions on this matter must have been filed within 30 days of the September
2005 Order, regardless of the facts and circumstances of the case. This was error.
IV.

CLAUSING'S ADMISSION OF ADDITIONAL ERROR IN THE ORDER
FURTHER JUSTIFIES REVERSAL OF THE LABOR COMMISSION.
Importantly, Clausing's argument does not deny that the September 2005 order

improperly ordered TTD compensation of $183,561.85. Instead, Clausing argues that this
mistake should simply be ignored because she claims she should have been awarded
$123,061.20 as Temporary Partial Disability compensation. Needless to say, the Labor
Commission's error awarding TTD is not invalidated simply because Clausing claims a
second separate Temporary Partial Disability partially makes up for the TTD mistake.
The fact remains, and is admitted by Clausing, that no TTD benefits should have been
awarded. That simple fact justifies reversal.
The existence of further mistakes claimed by Clausing regarding Temporary Partial
Disability does not make the TTD error harmless, especially when the claimed Temporary
Partial Disability errors have never been shown. Further, even if Clausing's claim for
Temporary Partial Disability compensation were true, which is disputed, it still only offsets
a portion of the amount improperly awarded as TTD.
Far from justifying the Labor Commission's errors, the further errors claimed by
Clausing simply serve as additional reasons the Labor Commission should be reversed.
A.

Clausing Is Not Entitled to Either TTD or Temporary Partial Disability.

Clausing's claim to Temporary Partial Disability of $123,061.20 is not supported by
the evidence. The overwhelming bulk of the $123,061.20 claimed by Clausing purportedly
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arose, as admitted by Clausing, before the January 2002 settlement and October 22, 2002
Order. (Rec. 383-384). Clausmg waived all claims to such amounts when she voluntarily
entered the settlement agreement while represented by counsel. (Rec. 364-369). The
remaining post-settlement disability amounts claimed by Clausing are not compensable,
inasmuch as they do not arise out of any industrial accident. Clausing was cleared to work,
and in fact had been working full time as of May 31,2002. (Rec. 383). She thereafter chose
not to work.
More importantly, neither the September, 2005 Order, nor the March 17, 2006 Order
awarded Clausing any Temporary Partial Disability. Clausing is not entitled to such an award
now.
B.

Clausing's Claims to Temporary Partial Disability Compensation Has
Been Waived.

Additionally, even if Clausing were owed Temporary Partial Disability, the fact
remains that Clausing admits to knowing of the mistake as of September 23, 2005 when the
Order was issued. By her own admission and under her own arguments, Clausing was
allowed only 30 days to appeal any mistake. She not only failed to appeal the September
2005 Order, she consciously chose not to do so. Clausing's knowledge of the mistake and
decision not to appeal the mistake is set forth in affidavit form (Rec. 395-396), as well as
letter form. (Rec. 214). Clausing's Brief of Appellee confirms that she not only knew of the
claimed Temporary Partial Disability mistake, but that she purposefully waived her right to
appeal Temporary Partial Disability issue because, under her interpretation of the September
2005 Order, unless Appellant promptly paid the amount demanded, Clausing could obtain
even more money as Temporary Total Disability compensation.
Statement of Facts 10, 13; Rec. 394-395, pars. 7-11).
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(Brief of Appellee,

V.

THE APPELLANT DID NOT FAIL TO MARSHAL EVIDENCE.
Clausing asserts that Appellant has failed to marshal the evidence. Clausing fails,

however, to describe the evidence which Appellant purportedly failed to marshal.
Additionally, Clausing has presented no evidence to show her entitlement to $183,561.85 in
TTD. Quite to the contrary, Clausing has admitted that she is not entitled to $183,561.85 in
TTD. (Brief of Appellee, Statement of Facts 10, 13). Therefore, there is no fault in failing
to present evidence "in support of the trial court's findings" awarding TTD, when it is
undisputed that no such evidence exists.
CONCLUSION
Clausing fails to recognize several facts. The dispute regarding the meaning of the
September 2005 Order did not arise until December 1, 2005. Prior to that time, Appellant's
interpretation of the September 2005 Order was the only reasonable interpretation. In
contrast, Clausing's interpretation admittedly made the order improper and contrary to the
evidence. Appellant cannot be required to appeal an order that when properly interpreted,
should not be appealed.
Additionally, the meaning of the September 2005 Order was unknown from December
1, 2005 until March 17, 2006. Only at that point did the matter become appealable under a
Motion for Review. The Motion for Review was thereafter filed in a timely manner. The
Labor Commission failed to recognize that the Motion for Review was taken from the March
17, 2006, failed to address the content of the Motion for Review, and thereby erred.
Clausing's argument that the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure are not "required" in
administrative proceedings is irrelevant. Of relevancy, however, is the fact that under Utah
law, administrative proceedings are to be more flexible and informal, and therefore, they are
not bound by the restrictions in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Appellant's use of the
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principles of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure are consistent with the flexible and informal
intent of administrative proceedings.
Further, contrary to Clausing's argument, "[i]nherent in the power to make an
administrative decision is the authority to reconsider a decision. [Citations omitted]. . . The
absence of specific authority in the governing statutes is not determinative. Every tribunal
has some power to correct its own mistakes."Career Serv. Review Bd. v. Utah Dep't of
Corrections. 942 P.2d 933, 946 (Utah 1997)(emphasis added).
Clausing also concedes that under the ''continuing jurisdiction" provisions of the
Workers Compensation Act, "subsequently discovered facts," "evidence of some significant
change or new development," and "proof of the previous award's inadequacy" would each
be sufficient to grant the Labor Commission the authority to correct the acknowledged ALJ
mistake. By conceding such in the face of 1) the subsequently discovered fact that the
meaning of the September 2005 Order was in dispute; 2) the significant change or new
development created both by the dispute and the March 17, 2006 Order; and 3) the admitted
fact of the September 2005 Order's inadequacy, Clausing concedes that the Labor
Commission did, in fact, have the authority to grant the relief requested, and erred in
determining otherwise.
The arguments contained in Appellant's motion for relief and Motion for Review were
justified under the principles of Rules 52, 59 and 60 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
They were likewise appropriate under the more flexible and informal administrative
proceedings. The issues contained therein were properly and timely presented, and are now
properly before the Appeals Court.
The meaning of the ALJ's September 2005 Order was unknown from December 1,
2005 to March 17, 2006, and when it became known it contained, as admitted by Clausing,
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a significant judicial error. It awarded $183,561.85 in TTD, absolutely none of which
Clausing was entitled to. Under such circumstances, the Labor Commission erred in not
correcting the mistake or error.
Respectfully submitted this \u day of May, 2007.
PLANT, CHRISTENSEN & KANELL
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